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This paper was written for an ANU Conference of February 1999, following anti-Chinese 
rioting in the lead-up to the fall of Suharto in 1998, and published with other conference papers in 
Perspectives on the Chinese Indonesians, ed. Michael Godley & Grayson Lloyd (Adelaide: 
Crawfurd House Publishing, 2001), pp.67-82.   
 
I was struck recently [1998] by an exchange I witnessed in a Canberra restaurant, when 
an Indonesian visitor (Dede Oetomo) was explaining his background as a "Chinese" 
Indonesian, albeit with quite a few Javanese or Balinese ancestors from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century on the mother's side.  My Filipino colleague (Rey Ileto) noted with some 
surprise -- "in the Philippines you would simply be a Filipino;  in Indonesia I guess I would be 
a Chinese."   This was rather troubling to this important Filipino intellectual, interpreter of 
Philippine identity & son of a prominent Philippine general. 
How is it that a substantial minority of urban Indonesian culture and language, and 
mixed ethnic background, is considered Cina and somehow alien in Indonesia, where the 
analogous group in Thailand or the Philippines is considered simply Thai or Filipino?  And 
how is it possible that passions could be so strong around this single word that otherwise law-
abiding Indonesian citizens should feel no shame in reviling, robbing, killing and raping their 
fellow-countrymen because of it?  In other words, why has this category been constructed by 
many Indonesians to be outside their moral and political community, at least at times of social 
stress and breakdown?  Perhaps most puzzling, why is it that the most terrifying outburst of 
anti-Chinese hostility since 1947, and potentially since 1740, should occur in 1998, a time 
when the whole Sino-Indonesian community is more culturally integrated into the mainstream 
than at any time in the past? 
 
Why "Chinese"? 
To simplify, let me mention just two factors: 
Firstly,  in the Philippines there was almost a century (1756-1850) when immigration 
from China was forbidden and Chinese already there had to become Catholic and marry 
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locally.  Once migrants from China began arriving again in the 1850s it was clear that the 
established group of Chinese mestizo had nothing in common with them. They dropped the 
label Chinese and eventually adopted a new imagining, "Filipino".   
In Indonesia by contrast migration was never interrupted, and there was more of a 
gradual spectrum between one extreme of culturally Chinese and the other of culturally 
Javanese, Malay, etc. “Chinese”. There was a consistent policy by foreign rulers (Dutch 
and still more Japanese) to regard these "Chinese" as a single group distinct from the 
native majority (Indiers or inlanders in Dutch usage).  They encouraged this dichotomy 
by treating them as a single legal and administrative category, controlled by Chinese 
officers who were also the economically powerful collecters of colonial taxes, of which 
the most lucrative were those on  opium sales. These tax farmers were a major prop of the 
nineteenth century colonial state, just as "court Jews" were of the eighteenth century 
modernising states in Europe.  Like the court Jews, they needed the loyalty and control of 
impoverished, culturally different  "outsider" immigrants in order to maintain their 
leverage with the colonial state (Butcher & Dick 1993).  Hence they colluded with the 
Dutch in using the label Cina, despite the cultural chasm between themselves and the new 
totok (newcomer) sojourners. 
Secondly, Filipino identity was created in the late nineteenth century by a Spanish-
educated elite most of whom would have been considered peranakan (local-born Chinese) in 
Indonesia.  The peranakan too have a reasonable claim to being the first Indonesians, as the 
largest element in the nineteenth century of that urban Malay-speaking culture which 
eventually became Indonesian national culture.  There were about a quarter of a million of 
them in Java by 1900 (Skinner 1996: 56), far outnumbering the marginal, poor, visibly 
"different", immigrants.  But the Indonesian national identity was imagined a generation later 
than the Filipino one, following rather than preceding the peak of Chinese nationalist 
enthusiasm in 1911. Idealistic young people searching for a dignified modern identity had 
grasped at the “Overseas Chinese” one, since the “Indonesian” alternative was not yet 
available to them.  Had Dutch education and Indonesian nationalism begun in the late 
nineteenth century when Spanish education and Filipino nationalism did, Chinese-descended 
mestizos would have been the torch-bearers in both places.  
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"Outsider" status 
The retention of some attenuated form of Chinese religion was one of the boundary 
markers which kept these peranakan distinct from the local population. Conversion to Islam 
usually meant absorption into the majority after a generation or two.  The other factor was the 
Dutch-dominated plural society, which not only permitted but encouraged an occupational 
and residential separation of ethnic groups.  The Indonesian-Chinese symbiosis is certainly 
much older than the Dutch, between an "insider" elite whose political power is expected to 
bring economic benefits, and an "outsider" minority who are denied access to political power 
and therefore authorized and required to act entrepreneurially.  But the colonial order froze 
these relationships and prevented any Chinese assimilation into the local elite, which became 
in the nineteenth century either Dutch-exclusive or aristocratically involuted Javanese-
exclusive.    
Colonial policy had the effect of reinforcing and fossilising an indigenous status 
hierarchy dependent on birth and government position, discouraged from taking commercial 
initiatives. In Java, where this  policy had longest to work, the absence of a native middle 
class became a cliché of twentieth century social observers.  By contrast status in the Sino-
Indonesian community was determined primarily by wealth, since the social origins of that 
community were low and it was largely excluded from the bureaucracy and landholding.     
The social hierarchies of Netherlands Indian colonial society fit rather well the theory of 
the status gap, developed primarily to explain why a Jewish entrepreneurial minority was 
essential in eastern European societies divided sharply between aristocrats and peasants.  
"Outsider" entrepreneurs are necessary, argues Irwin Rinder, when "the yawning social void 
which occurs when superior and subordinate portions of a society are not bridged by 
continuous, intermediate degrees of status" (Rinder 1959: 253). Status-conscious Dutch 
colonials and Javanese aristocrats both sought to maintain a social distance from the masses, 
and encouraged an outsider group, defined as Chinese to fill the intermediary roles.  Chinese 
therefore became "essential [but] outsiders", to quote the title of a recent book (Chirot & Reid 
1997). There was no doubt either that many European colonials identified Chinese in 
Southeast Asia with the category that had been developed for Jews in Europe.  They used a 
familiar imagery to shift the negative, disturbing features of capitalism onto these minorities, 
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making it possible for Dutch colonials to see themselves (despite the evidence) rather in the 
role of paternalistic protectors of the passive natives.  
 
The “ethical” direction of Dutch policy around 1900 turned much of its reforming zeal 
against ,  these Chinese roles as tax farmers and distributors,  leading to a major assault on 
their position during the ensuing two decades.  This was the first of many attempts in the 
twentieth century to "nationalise" or "normalise" the economy at the expense of old-style 
Chinese entrepreneurs (Butcher & Dick 1993: 38-39, 202-07; Shiraishi 1997: 188-90). By 
1910, as Shiraishi (1997:190) puts it, the Chinese: 
were no longer needed as the state's financiers, they became vulnerable to violent 
popular hatred, and they were politically powerless even as they became an 
economically prosperous 'middleman' minority in a society neatly structured along racial 
lines. 
 
Like Jews in Europe after the French revolution, Chinese-Indonesians were freed from 
various restrictions around 1900, and ceased to be an economically-integrated “Chinese” 
ghetto controlled by a narrow elite of officers and tax-farmers. They became “emancipated” 
into the modern struggle of rival rootlessnesses, seeking new nationalist identities in the age 
of mass-based politics. 
It was from increasingly rootless young Sino-Indonesians that the first threat of an 
anticolonial and nationalist kind began to trouble Dutch police around 1908, not from the 
officially-anointed harbingers of nationalism, the Javanese aristocrats of Budi Utomo.  The 
Dutch were alarmed to find that Javanese workers were also beginning to join some radical, 
Chinese-dominated unions, of which one of the more extreme was the Kong Sing kongsi 
(association) in Surakarta.  Dutch fears of a common radical front were ended abruptly in 
1911, when Javanese members stormed out of the Kong Sing to form their own Rekso 
Rumekso kongsi, and to fight their former comrades in the streets of Surakarta. This Rekso 
Rumekso quickly developed into the beginnings of Sarekat Islam, the first mass 
racial/national movement under the banner of Islam (Shiraishi 1997: 187-205). Part of the 
reason for this fateful falling out was the effect of the Chinese revolution of 1911 on young 
Chinese-Indonesians, for whom it represented a route to national dignity as the equal of 
Europeans and Japanese (granted European status in the Indies a decade earlier).  Young Sino-
Indonesians suddenly began to dress like Europeans and see themselves as distinct from the 
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Indonesian majority.  Separate Chinese and Indonesian nationalisms, in other words, were 
born on the streets of Javanese cities within the same turbulent period, even if both were for a 
time minority currents in their respective communities. 
Rival Chinese and Indonesian nationalisms in the 1920s and '30s were each trying to 
imagine new identities that excluded the other, even though both began from similar origins.  
By the 1930s there was still no "Indonesian" or even Dutch nationality to belong to, but 
several rival national ideas in the air. On the other hand there was a colonial elite and its 
institutions, where people of Chinese, indigenous and European background mixed on the 
basis of Dutch and Malay language.   Though not using the label, the dominant Sino-
Indonesian figures of that time were in practice as "Indonesian" as anybody in that period.  
They spoke Indonesian and Dutch rather than local languages or Chinese, they were born in 
the ethnically mixed cities of the colony, and they identified with the Netherlands Indies as a 
whole rather than with a local nationalism such as that of Java, Minahassa or Minangkabau.  
Twang Peck Yang has shown that the "Chinese" business leaders of the late colonial period 
were almost exclusively local-born peranakan who identified locally and spoke no Chinese—
in marked contrast to European business leadership, which was strongly oriented to a Dutch 
or German fatherland.  The Sino-Indonesian business elite invested much in Indonesia, a little 
in Singapore, but very little in China, with which it had nothing in common but that awkward 
label (Twang 1998: 38-52).  The politically stable (if repressive) conditions of late 
colonialism, in other words, favoured a business leadership which was also stable and locally 
rooted.  
In the turbulent 1940s this localised Chinese elite lost its property and economic 
influence. The Japanese rulers of 1942-45 favoured "Chinese" Chinese who could write in 
Kanji, and their extremely autarchic economic policies gave opportunities to the “outsiders” 
ready to risk all in smuggling and bribing authorities.  The struggling Indonesian Republic of 
1945-50 proved even more damaging to old Chinese capital than to Dutch capital; at the 
leadership level because alienating Western capital was deemed fatal for international 
recognition; and on the ground because Chinese shops were more visible and vulnerable to 
angry mobs.  On the other hand the Republic could not have survived without the help of a 
new Chinese business element.  Despite the rhetoric of anti-capitalism and extreme 
nationalism, the military and political bosses of the revolution all had a Chinese at their elbow 
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to provide the essential supplies and finances, and these were almost invariably "outsider" 
Chinese-speaking totok, epitomised by the China-born Hok-chiu Liem Sioe Liong.  They 
came from nowhere because they were willing to take big risks in smuggling goods under the 
Dutch guns, and bribing and bending rules.  They had no property to protect under the Dutch 
order. They formed links with military power-holders which have served both sides well 
(Twang 1998: 178-81).  Despite their (at least initial) “outsider” quality, they deserve the 
gratitude of the Indonesian Republic. 
The expulsion of the Dutch from Indonesian economic life in the 1950s, and the 
takeover of the state by a new Indonesian intelligentsia, removed much of the status gap, and 
began to generate an indigenous entrepreneurial group in competition with Chinese.  The 
bureaucracy expanded enormously to cater for the increasing numbers of educated 
Indonesians who wanted the status and security of government position.  Mainstream 
nationalism had always found Marxism attractive as an explanation for Indonesian weakness, 
and right through the1960s and '70s capitalism remained a dirty word, seen as incompatible 
with the kind of just society for which nationalism fought.  Capitalism remained associated 
with alien evil, its harsh and greedy edges sheeted home to Chinese or westerners--much as 
they were blamed on Jews in Christianity's late Middle Ages. 
Culture undoubtedly has a role in entrepreneurial success, but only if it is seen in the 
specific context of minority and national social construction. The precolonial Indonesian 
society, though highly entrepreneurial, did have a redistributive pattern whereby wealth was 
expected to be recycled into status through feasting and the assistance of relatives and clients.  
The colonial system and its nationalist mirror reified this elite preference to the point where 
status and business were almost mutually exclusive.  Only moral "outsiders" (and at a micro-
level, women) were allowed to be stingy with their money, by using it to build up a business. 
In the Sukarno years capitalism remained associated with alien evil, and there were moral 
constraints on any but Chinese getting seriously into it.  
 
The Suharto years: the paradox of cultural assimilation and renewed pariahdom 
Officially the new Indonesian nation-state adopted a policy of assimilation, 
discouraging, and after 1966 prohibiting, public expressions of Chinese language or culture.  
The Indonesian censuses dropped colonial-style questions about ethnicity, and officially all 
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citizens are supposed to be equal - a situation similar to Thailand, and much more flexible 
than the racially bounded polities of Malaysia and Singapore. The Sukarno regime sought to 
incorporate Chinese like every other ethnicity into a diverse national community, with a few 
left-leaning peranakan politicians in most cabinets of that period (see Siauw in this volume). 
The 32-year regime of Suharto reintroduced a kind of economic and political stability 
that might have been expected to remove the business advantages of “outsider” status and to 
produce a more integrated business culture as had been happening in the 1920s and ‘30s. The 
virtual cessation of immigration after 1930, and the success of Indonesian as a unifying 
national language, should have made this easier.  Yet an extraordinary ambivalence marked 
the Suharto regime in respect of Chinese, which has proved to have some very sinister results.  
This regime began in a revived mood of great hostility to all things Chinese, presumably 
based on its sharp reaction against Sukarno’s closeness to Beijing and a virulent anti-
communism which provided the legitimation for Suharto’s rise to power.1  New regulations in 
1967 banned Chinese newspapers, indeed Chinese writing in any form, Chinese social 
organisations and schools, and the public celebration of Chinese religion and customs.  A 
name-changing campaign persuaded most of those previously using Chinese names that they 
might escape the worst discrimination if they changed to Indonesian-sounding ones.  This was 
immediately frustrated by the adding to identity cards of an extra zero, making Chinese 
ancestry clear to every official. In an atmosphere tolerant towards corruption, it became 
established practice throughout the bureaucracy to expect those of Chinese descent to pay 
under the counter for government services they received. Chinese were excluded from the 
bureaucracy, the army and political life, and only a small number were admitted to state 
universities (Suryadinata, 1992:145-64; Coppell and Siauw in this volume). 
But the opening to foreign investment and rapid economic growth gave unprecedented 
opportunities to Sino-Indonesian business, whose efficiency, capital, and networks were 
absolutely indispensable to the new economic climate.  Those who flourished most were the 
famous crony capitalists, notably Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan, both of whom were 
already heavily involved in smuggling and other shady business of the Diponegoro Division 
1While anti-communism marked the whole New Order regime, a degree of paranoia about Chinese 
influence appears to been specific to Suharto, often handicapping the foreign ministry in pursuing a flexible 
policy in Indonesia’s national interest.  
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back in the 1950s when Suharto was its corrupt commander.2  They were mostly from the 
diminishing band of totok outsiders, who had built links with particular Suharto-related 
military units before 1965.  But even these rent-seeking conglomerates with their palace 
connections could only do well because of their links with a broader base of efficient and 
predominately Sino-Indonesian small business.  
As has been documented in relation to the timber industry, Suharto began by dealing 
with Sino-Indonesian loggers in consequence of their expertise as partners of foreign 
concessionaries.  When he squeezed out the foreign firms after 1980 the handful of Chinese-
Indonesian cronies (Bob Hasan, Prajogo Pangestu, Liem Sioe Liong) became absolutely 
central.  Their vast extra-budgetary revenues from timber concessions gave Suharto a weapon 
he could use both to enrich himself and his family, and to pursue uneconomic pet projects 
such as the national petrochemical industry (Chandra Asri), Habibie's aircraft factories, 
Taman Mini and transmigration, without a head-on clash with the technocratic ministers in 
charge of the budget.  Precisely because of their outsider status and lack of entree into the 
bureaucracy, these cronies posed no threat and had minimal capacity to resist the first family's 
demands. 
Thus the Indonesian Chinese were included not only for their business expertise, 
international connections, and pre-existing business links with the armed forces, but 
also for their lack of status as an independent political force.  Of course, the 
resentment of the Chinese on the part of the pribumi rose as a consequence, 
increasing the marginality of the Chinese should they ever lose the protection of 
Suharto, and thus increasing their dependence on Suharto (Ascher 1998: 55).3 
 
On the positive side, economic growth and the liberalization of the economy gradually 
broke down the majority prejudice against private enterprise and money-making activity.  
There is now an indigenous middle class, admittedly mostly working in foreign or Chinese-
managed firms, which often merges with the Sino-Indonesian middle class, though also 
competing with it in business.  This period marks therefore the emergence of a more normal 
middle class, documented by Robison (1986), which might eventually lead to the kind of 
functional integration regardless of ethnicity which we find in some of the advanced 
2Bob Hasan differed from most of these operators in being a peranakan, born in Semarang in 1931, but was 
a nobody until attaching himself to General Gatot Subroto, Suharto's predecessor as Diponegoro 
commander.  Hence he may still have played the "outsider" role.  
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economies.  Ruth McVey (1992: 25) has pointed to a change in attitude of the regime itself 
during the 1980s, as it began to see that it was so involved with Chinese business that the 
periodic outbreaks of anti-Chinese popular violence were not so much an outlet for 
diversionary scapegoating as another way of attacking the regime itself.4    In the 1990s, 
however, as Suharto identified a Benny Moerdani-led Army as the greatest potential threat to 
his and his family's power, he began to play with the fire of Islamic and racist resentment as 
never before.  There is probably truth in the allegations of a Suharto hand provoking some of 
the worst examples of racial violence since 1966, particularly through son-in-law General 
Prabowo in January and February of 1998.  While we may hope that those who deal in this 
dastardly currency will be repaid in kind, we should not imagine that eliminating Soeharto has 
removed the problem.  As long as the more fundamental features of outsider status remain in 
Indonesian society, there will always be irresponsible politicians to exploit them.  
The great expansion of the middle class over the past 20 years changed profoundly the 
dynamics of the relation between Sino-Indonesian and pribumi. If continued, it might 
eventually have lead to an easing of tensions on the Thai model. The present is however an 
extremely dangerous phase, because two still-distinct middle classes are now competing 
directly over a shrinking pie. It has always been the rise of a majority middle class which 
marks the greatest danger for pariah or outsider entrepreneurs.  
 
Why is the violence occurring now? 
To a considerable degree the measures against Chinese culture of the Soeharto regime 
succeeded in reducing the remaining cultural features which had made some Sino-Indonesians 
very distinctive.  Only the oldest and most marginal now do not speak fluent Indonesian.  Sino-
Indonesians are once again (as in the nineteenth century) an Indonesian ethnic group with one of 
the highest proportions using Indonesian at home--much higher than Javanese or Sundanese.  So 
why was discrimination against Chinese more marked in the Suharto era than the Sukarno one, 
and why is violence of an explicitly racist character more marked now than for generations? 
3 The same point is made more generally by Suryadinata (1992: 142): "These Indonesians in power feel 
safer using the Chinese rather than their pribumi counterparts".  
4 Hannah Arendt makes the same point about anti-semitism being essentially directed against the state in 
nineteenth century Europe: "each class of society which came into a conflict with the state as such became 
anti-semitic because the only social group which seemed to represent the state were the Jews", Hannah 
Arendt, Antisemitism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968),  p.25.  
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Some points are relatively obvious: 
Economic Crisis   
The current crisis is the kind of testing time for Indonesia that the 1930s were for Europe.  
Though Indonesia has by no means reached the bottom, a 15% GDP loss is already officially 
estimated  for 1998, and by the end of 1999 will exceed the 24% GDP loss suffered by Germany 
over the whole depression period 1929-33. Moreover the boom which preceded 1998 had brought 
Indonesia to roughly the levels reached by Germany in the 1890s or Italy in the 1920s (derived 
from Maddison 1995). By 1997 the degree of urbanization in Indonesia (about 35%) was 
comparable to that which Europe as a whole had reached in 1925.  In Indonesia's 1998 
depression, like that in 1930s Europe but unlike previous Indonesian crises, there were millions 
of angry educated unemployed in the cities. 
Such an economic crisis undermines confidence in the global financial system, and in the 
beneficence of ruling elites.   Demogogues such as Hitler and Mussolini become plausible to far 
wider circles when they claim that the problems are all caused by racial, national or class enemies 
manipulating the system.  Looked at with the advantage of hindsight, it was this political 
undermining of confidence which was the most fatal consequence of the 1930s, not the terrible 
but temporary suffering induced by the depression itself.   To judge from the industrial countries 
which experienced radical political changes as a result of the 1929-33 depression, the most 
dangerous time politically may be three or four years into the depression, as conditions begin to 
improve and new messiahs can appear to have solutions.  
 
Democratization.  
Again it is an obvious point that pre-modern monarchies, empires, and autocracies 
generally allowed or encouraged their peoples to remain distinct, united only by the personal 
power at the top.  Democratization involves not only lifting the lid on all sorts of buried hatreds, 
as we have seen in the ex-Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,  but also allows politicians to exploit 
these hatreds cynically to win votes.  At a fairly superficial level, this helps to explain why a kind 
of programmatic anti-Semitism developed in Europe only in the last quarter of the 19th century, 
as franchises were widened to include the whole population.  Nobody should imagine that 
Indonesia has an easy task to survive a free and fair election without further exacerbating popular 
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hostilities and scapegoating.   So far (in April 1999), one must congratulate the leaders of the 
major parties on having avoided such dangerous tactics, while wondering whether this is in part a 
consequence of  an ingrained but endangered habit of seeing politics as an elite concern.  
There are some more profound and complex difficulties, however, in the transformation of 
any plural society into a modern nation state.  Hannah Arendt was one of the more acute 
observers of the same paradox in Europe, of anti-semitism reaching its height as democratization 
and cultural assimilation progressed. As she put this dilemma,  
Equality of condition, though it is certainly a basic requirement for justice, is 
nevertheless among the greatest and most uncertain ventures of modern mankind.  The 
more equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that actually 
exist between people; and thus all the more unequal do individuals and groups 
become. ....The great challenge to the modern period, and its peculiar danger, has been 
that in it man for the first time confronted man without the protection of differing 
circumstances and conditions. And it has been precisely this new concept of equality 
that has made modern race relations so difficult, for there we deal with natural 
differences which by no possible and conceivable change of condition can become less 
conspicuous.  It is because equality demands that I recognize each...individual as my 
equal, that the conflicts between different groups, which for reasons of their own are 
reluctant to grant each other this basic equality, take on such terribly cruel forms 
(Arendt 1968: 54). 
 
Daniel Chirot reminds us that the changes brought about a century ago in Europe by mass 
migration to the cities, privatisation of communal land, rationalisation of the law and the 
development of a new middle class "neither quite in the elite nor, any longer, a part of the peasant 
masses", both unsettled old identities and provided possibilities for a modern nationalism which 
could redefine ancient neighbours as outsiders.  The political environment conducive to the rise 
of anti-Semitism in Austria and Germany was marked by a reaction against the liberal and 
progressive German culture [read today's globalisation], which helps explain why it was precisely 
the most assimilated, successful and cosmopolitan Jews who most provoked anti-Semitism.  "Not 
only were they successful competitors in the economic and cultural marketplace, but they were 
also interpreted as insidious agents of antinationalism who poisoned the purity of the nation by 
introducing foreign--that is liberal and antinationalist--ideas and practices" (Chirot 1997: 8-9).  
To translate to the Indonesian situation, it is because people like the Wanandi brothers are so 
Indonesian that they can be the target of an explicitly racial kind of politics, which the real 
outsiders cannot.  
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Hopeful conclusions. 
My aim has been to explain that the racial hostility and violence occurring in Indonesia 
is not the consequence of a peculiar defect of national character, but of the particularly 
dangerous historical conjuncture the country faces.  We should not despair, but we should be 
aware of the profound dangers, and take them as seriously as they deserve.  There are real 
grounds for hope that Indonesia will get through this economic and political crisis less 
wounded than European societies were by theirs.  
There are many specific reforms which will make a benign outcome more likely and a 
tragic one less so.  Indonesia’s wonderfully diverse social fabric is the greatest potential asset 
in negotiating the crisis. Pluralism is inescapable as long as Indonesia remains a vast 
Archipelagic country, and this established pluralism within an even quite assertive 
nationalism is the best guarantee that narrow ethno-nationalism of a Balkan type can be 
avoided.  However the culture of the mainly urban Chinese-Indonesian minority, along with 
those of the hunter-gatherers and shifting cultivators at the other end of the spectrum, have 
been singled out as somehow unacceptable within that diversity.  It is essential to the gradual 
removal of the “outsider” status of the minority both that their culture and symbols cease to be 
popularly seen as outside the moral community, and that the economy become more open and 
regulated.  The second half of this equation is far harder in the badly regulated and corrupt 
environment from which Indonesia currently suffers. Overt discrimination against the 
minority is almost certain to produce opposite results as it has in the past, with an increasingly 
distorted economy requiring increasingly “outsider” solutions and special deals.  
The first half can be more easily achieved by any government which seriously wants to 
address this problem, especially if it has intelligent support from community leaders  in doing 
so.  I want to focus on two particular initiatives which have not been much discussed.  
 
A New Label  
Throughout this chapter and in all my discussion of this issue, I am increasingly 
troubled by the tyranny of the term “Chinese” in English or “Cina” in Indonesian.  The 
problem with this term is that it is used to cover too many contradictory things, including a 
minority which is patently Indonesian in every respect, as well as a language and culture most 
of this minority know nothing of and a foreign power often seen as a threat.  Changing Cina to 
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Tionghoa in no sense solves this problem, unless one term (presumably Tionghoa) is used for 
the foreign reality and the other for the Indonesian one.  The Filipino term “Chinoy” has been 
invented to get around just this problem there.  If Chinese-Indonesians want to pursue the path 
of acceptance as one Indonesian minority among many, they first must agree on a satisfactory 
name.  Peranakan and Keturunan will be among the candidates, but an even more artificial 
term with no prior associations might serve the purpose better.  A country that solved so many 
problems by inventing the term “Indonesia” should be able to resolve this one.  
 
A legitimate place in national culture. 
The education syllabus and the pattern of national days and national rituals have been 
powerful tools to build a sense of Indonesian identity which embraces regional and ethnic 
identities of various kinds.  The Sino-Indonesian absence from this system is a powerful 
symbolic exclusion from the definition of the nation.  Like other ethnic groups (suku) the 
Chinese-Indonesian minority needs to make its case for inclusion in the syllabus and for the 
canonization of a particular national hero (pahlawan) of ethnic Chinese background. This is 
the established means to establish the legitimacy of a group within the national community, 
and within the educational system.  There is no shortage of candidates for such an honour.  By 
the usual criterion for official national hero status, leading a major fight against the Dutch 
colonisers, the leader of the Chinese-Javanese forces in the “Chinese war” of 1740-43, Tan 
Singko alias Singseh, is well qualified.  So are the elected leaders of the Lan-fang kongsi of 
Monterado, north of Pontianak (West Kalimantan), who defied Dutch claims over them for 
many years until finally defeated in 1854.  But in an era of reform it is time to look for 
national role models among those who more positively built the national culture, such as the 
peranakan writers and publishers who developed a Malay-language press and modern popular 
literature in the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
This is but one way to redefine the national identity in a more inclusive and positive 
way.  Another is to insist on a fair representation of the Chinese-Indonesian heritage in 
Indonesia’s many museums and the theme parks (Taman Mini) which now grace many 
provincial capitals as well as Jakarta.  Through such means the next generation may do better 
than the present one to remove the “outsider” status of a minority crucial to Indonesia’s 
modernisation.  
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